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Autonomous Weapons and the Problem of
State Accountability
Daniel N. Hammond*

Abstract
Currenty in development and expected to become functional in the nearfuture, fully
autonomous weapons will have the capacity to operate entirey on their own, selecting targets and
completing missions without human involvement. The propective development of these weapons
has raised concerns among some scholars who fear that the weapons would be unable to meet
internationallegal standards. One criticism consistently raised is that in the event one of these
weapons commits a war crime or human riights violation, it is not clear who should be held
accountable. In this context, critics have focused primariy on whether military officers,
designers, or manufacturers could (or should) be held individually liable. Few, however, have
explored whether state liability is a viable option. This Comment takes up this inquiry,
arguing that state liability would be preferable to individual liability because the state is in the
best position to minimi!e its weapons'potentialviolations of internationallaw and seems to be
the most culpable actor in a moral sense. Nevertheless, although state liability ispossible in the
abstract, legal and practical barriers make the international legal regime as it stands illequpped to ensure that states would actually be held responsiblefor their weapons' crimes. If
state liabilit is to resolve the accountabilityproblem, the internationalcommunity will need to
make adjustments to this regime.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 24, 2012, a U.S. drone strike killed an elderly woman in front
of her grandchildren as she tended her crops in northern Pakistan.' Absent some
legitimate justification,2 the drone strike almost certainly violates international
law,' and the pilots could potentially be held criminally liable.' In fact, if the pilot
deployed the drone's missiles with some illicit motive (to avenge his fallen
comrades, for example), he would definitely be guilty of a war crime.5
But what happens when the pilot is removed from the equation? What if
the drone operated completely on its own (that is, without human oversight) by
virtue of highly sophisticated artificial intelligence? If this fully autonomous
weapon had killed the Pakistani grandmother without lawful justification, who
should be held responsible for the crime?
This scenario may seem far-fetched, given that no country currently fields
any drones that can operate with this level of autonomy.' The technology that
would enable the deployment of such fully autonomous weapon systems
(AWSs), however, may emerge in the near future.' As these systems will have the

1
2

See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, "WiLL I BE NEXT?" U.S. DRONE STRIKES IN PAKISTAN 18-20
(2013), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/asa330132013en.pdf.
The U.S. government has not offered an explanation for these attacks. See Naureen Shah, Time For
the Truth About Targeted' Killings and US Drones' Civilian Victims, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 22, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/22/illegal-deaths-drones-obamaadministration.

3

See, for example, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR ("No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."); AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 1, at 43 ("Killing a civilian who has taken no direct part in hostilities
is an arbitrary deprivation of life.").

4

See Michael W. Lewis, Responses to the Ten Questions, 37 WM. MITCHiELL L. REv. 5021, 5030 (2011)
(noting that to be free from liability, an attacker must comply with the international laws of armed
conflict); Nathan Hodge & Noah Shachman, Drone Pilots Could Be Triedfor "War Crimes," Law Prof
Says,
WIRED
MAG.
(Apr.
28,
2010),
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/
04/drone-pilots-could-be-tried-for-war-crimes-law-prof-says/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (citing
former Navy officer David Glazier's statement in Congressional hearings that drone pilots could
be prosecuted).

s

See Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 J. APPLiED PHIL. 62, 66 (2007) (explaining that, when
someone kills "a column of enemy soldiers who have clearly indicated their desire to surrender"
while "seeking to revenge the 'deaths' of [his] comrades . . . they would immediately be charged
with a war crime"); see also infra Section IV.A (explaining why the failure to distinguish between
combatants and civilians and why excessive killing without a valid military objective both violate
International Humanitarian Law (IHL)).
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KIl..LER ROBOTS 3 (2012),

6

available
at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms111 2ForUpload_0_0.pdf
[hereinafter LosING HUMANITY] ("Fully autonomous weapons ... do not yet exist.").
7

See id. at 8 ("[S]ome military experts argue that the technology for fully autonomous weapons
could be achieved within decades.").
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capacity to engage targets without human intervention, many scholars believe
they could replace drones in future conflicts.
Furthermore, while the technology may seem a bit remote, the issue is
already beginning to take center stage among international law scholars and
actors. Major human rights organizations and prominent scholars have spoken
out against AWSs,' and the U.N. has begun to consider a preemptive ban on
them.' 0 Indeed, some think that the international community will reach an
agreement on these weapons in the next few years."
As the potential ban demonstrates, the prospect of removing humans from
the combat loop has produced discomfort among some human rights groups.12
One major concern they have raised is the accountability problem outlined
above.1 3 The weapons' artificial intelligence will enable them to analyze
information, determine courses of action, and execute responses to differing

8

See, for example, Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Lan and Ethicsfor Autonomous Weapon
Systems: Why a Ban Won't Work and How the Laws of War Can, HOOVER INSTITUTE (2013), 27,
available at http://www.hoover.org/research/law-and-ethics-autonomous-weapon-systems-whyban-wont-work-and-how-laws-war-can ("The incremental development and deployment of
autonomous weapon systems is inevitable."); Benjamin Kastan, Autonomous Weapons Systems: A
Coming Legal "Singulaity"?, 2013 U. lu.. J.L. TECH. & PoLY 45, 52 (2013) ("Autonomy is seen as
inevitable.") (citing P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR 127 (2009)); Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S.
Thurnher, "Out of the Loop": Autonomous Weapon Systems and the La, of Armed Conflict, 4 HARV.
NAT'L SEC. J. 231, 236-37 (2013) (noting that the active development of autonomous weapons
"can be expected").

9

See, for example, LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 6 (Human Rights Watch); Stephen Hawking et al.,
Stephen Hawking: 'Transcendence Looks at the Implications ofArtcial Intelligence - But Are We Taking Al
Seriousy Enough?", THE INDEPENDENT, May 1, 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/science/stephen-hawking-transcendence-looks-at-the-implications-of-artificial-intelligence-but-are-we-taking-ai-seriously-enough-9313474.html; Autonomous Weapons: States Must Address
Major Humanitanan, Ethical Concerns, INTERNATIONAL COiMITTEE OF THE RED CROss (Feb. 9,
2013), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/faq/q-and-a-autonomous-weapons.htm
(last visited Nov. 18, 2014).
See Brid-Aine Parnell, Killer Robots Could Be Banned by the UN Before 2016, FORBES (Nov. 18, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/bridaineparnell/2013/11/1 8/killer-robots-could-be-banned-bythe-un-before-2016/; see also Julie Deisher, UN Concludes First Multilateral Meeting on Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Sjstems, JURIST (May 18, 2014), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/05/un(last visited
concludes- first-multilateral-meeting-on-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems.php
Nov. 18, 2014).
See, for example, Parnell,supra note 10.

1o

11

12

See generally Christof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudidal Summay or Arbitrag
Executions, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://www.ohchr.org/
LOSING
Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A-HRC-23-47_en.pdf;
HUMANITY, supra note 6; Campaign to Stop Killer Robots: The Problem, STOPKII.ERROBOTS.ORG
(2014), http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/the-problem/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014); International
Committee for Robot Arms Control, ICRAC.NET, http://icrac.net/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).

13

See LosING HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 42.
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situations without human involvement.14 Unlike the activities of human-operated
drones, an AWS's actions are not easily attributable to a particular person. 5 This,
in combination with other factors, has led some scholars to question whether
the mere use of AWSs inherently violates international law." Furthermore, even
if such use by itself does not violate international law," an individual weapon
could certainly produce a violation in a given instance.'" In these situations, it is
unclear who should bear the blame for an AWS's crime.
AWS defenders have suggested that those sufficiently involved with the
weapon-military commanders, designers, or manufacturers-could be held
accountable for its illegal actions," but opponents have identified several flaws
with each of these potential candidates for responsibility.20 Few, however, have
considered the viability of holding the state itself accountable for crimes that its
AWSs commit. Indeed, hardly any scholars have asked whether this option is
desirable in theory or feasible in practice.2'
This Comment takes up these inquiries by offering a conceptual defense of
state accountability for AWS crimes and analyzing the primary mechanisms
through which a state could be held liable. Normatively, it would be preferable
to hold the state accountable for AWS crimes rather than commanding officers,
14

See Darren M. Stewart, New Technology and the Lai of Armed Conflict, 87 INT'L L. STUD. SER. US
NAVAL WAR Coi.. 271, 290 (2011).

15

See id.

16

17

See, for example, LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 46; Campaign to Stop Killer Robots: The
Problem, supra note 12; International Committee for Robot Arms Control, supra note 12; Heyns,
supra note 12, 1 31.
See generaly Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 279 (arguing that the mere use of AWSs is not

18

per se unlawful); see also Stephen E. White, Brave New World: Neurowarfare and the Imits of
InternationalHumanitarian Law, 41 CORNIL INTL L.J. 177, 190 (2008) ("[TInternational law most
likely does not prohibit [AWSs].").
See LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 42; Kastan, supra note 8, at 65; Schmitt & Thurnher, supra

19

20
21

note 8, at 279.
See, for example, Gary E. Marchant et al., International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots, 12
CoLUm. Sa. & TECH. L. REv. 272, 280 (2011); ARMIN KRISHNAN, KILLER ROBOTS: LEGAI.ITY
AND ETHICALITY OF AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS 103-05 (2009); Kastan, supra note 8, at 65-81;
Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 276-79.
For more detailed accounts of the problems with each of these options, see infra Section II.
It appears that Professor Jack M. Beard is the only author who has thoroughly addressed either of
these questions. See generaly Jack M. Beard, Autonomous Weapons and Human Responsibilities, 45 GIEO.
J. INT' L. 617 (2014) (arguing that state liability is infeasible because the primary legal requirement
needed for establishing accountability is human judgment). Other scholars have also touched on
state accountability, but neither addressed the issues on which this Comment focuses in much
depth. See, for example, Kastan, supra note 8, at 69-76 (exploring the feasibility of state liability
under U.S. domestic law but not international law); Stewart, supra note 14, at 291 (arguing that
state liability will turn on the "character of the conflict concerned" and the "respective State
obligations under international human rights law").
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designers, and manufacturers because the state would be in the best position to
ensure that these weapons consistently comply with international law. Moreover,
as the primary purchasers and users of these weapons, governments would be
the most culpable actors in the event of unforeseen AWS war crimes. Finally,
most states that utilize this technology will likely have the resources necessary to
compensate victims.

State accountability thus seems like a better option than individual
accountability in the abstract, but it is unclear whether the two forums in which
states could be held liable for AWS crimes would work in practice. The first
option is to have states whose citizens suffered from the crime (victim states) file
an action in the International Court of Justice (ICJ).22 The ICJ has broad subjectmatter jurisdiction and could therefore provide a forum for the victim state to
seek redress on behalf of its citizens. Unfortunately, the sharp limitations on its
personal jurisdiction will likely obstruct its power to hear AWS disputes. It also
lacks an enforcement mechanism to provide remedies for those cases that might
arise. These factors undermine the ICJ's effectiveness in terms of its ability to
hold states liable for AWS crimes.
Alternatively, the individual victims could bring suit against the state in a
domestic court.23 As AWS crimes will likely result in types of harm common in
tort (wrongful death, bodily injury, and property damage), many domestic courts
will likely have causes of action applicable to victims of AWS crimes. The
efficacy of this option would turn on whether oft-impoverished and poorly
situated victims file suit. Such lawsuits are unlikely to materialize. Even if these
actions were routinely filed, moreover, the doctrine of sovereign immunity could
very well bar them from proceeding past the filing stage. As such, domestic
courts also will likely prove insufficient as an accountability mechanism.
Thus, while state liability may sound appealing in theory, the legal and
practical problems associated with each of these options undermine the capacity
of the current international regime to hold states responsible for AWS crimes.24
22
23
24

See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
A third potential option would be for victim states or individuals to seek redress in a regional
tribunal such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (IACHR), or the African Court of Human Rights (ACHR). If modern-day drones
are any indication of how states will employ AWSs in the future, however, it is likely that they will
use them largely across regions. In these instances, regional courts would prove inadequate simply
because they would by definition only have jurisdiction over one of the parties. For instance, if a
U.S. AWS committed a human rights violation in Russia, neither Russia nor its affected citizens
could bring the dispute to the ECHR because the U.S. is not subject to its jurisdiction.
Furthermore, for intra-regional AWS disputes, only the ECHR might prove effective, as it has
jurisdiction over the forty-seven member states of the Council of Europe. See Ricardo Gosalbo-

Bono, The SignIicance of the Rile of Law and Its Implicationsfor the European Union and the United States,
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Holding states liable for future AWS crimes in domestic court or the ICJ,
therefore, seems largely infeasible and likely will not suffice to solve the
accountability problem.
Ultimately, then, state accountability is not currently practical, but it is still
normatively and theoretically superior to individual accountability. Given the
impracticality of state liability, the failure of scholars to examine this option is
understandable, but their disproportionate concentration on individual
responsibility has obscured the need for a drastic solution to the new
accountability problems AWSs will present: creating entirely new international
legal accountability mechanisms that will attach liability for AWS crimes to the
state employing them.
This Comment proceeds as follows. Section II provides background
information on AWSs, distinguishing them from less autonomous systems and
discussing their prospective development. Section III elaborates on the
accountability problem by evaluating each of the proposed options for individual
liability in more detail. It also offers a normative defense of state liability for
these crimes. Section IV describes existing bodies of international law that
would apply to the use of AWSs to show potential legal foundations for state
liability. Section V evaluates the different mechanisms by which a state might be
held liable for the crimes of its AWSs. It first examines the ICJ as a forum in
which one state might sue another over an AWS crime and then addresses the
ability of individual victims to sue in domestic courts. Section VI concludes by
summarizing the problems with each potential accountability mechanism,
discussing the implications of these problems, and proposing a possible way to
overcome them.
II. BACKGROUND ON AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS
An autonomous weapons system (AWS) is a "system that, once activated,
can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human

72 U. Pirrr. L. Riv. 229, 269-70 (2010). It thus has authority over countries that are likely to
develop AWSs, such as the United Kingdom and Russia, though it still lacks an enforcement
mechanism. See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judidal Independence in International Tribunals, 93
CAL. L. Riv. 1, 65 (2005). By contrast, the IACHR and ACHR do not have jurisdiction over
countries that are likely to utilize these weapons. The U.S. and Canada in particular have not
submitted to the IACHR's jurisdiction, see id. at 42, and no country subject to the ACHR's
jurisdiction is likely to be a major player in the AWS market. Asia and the Middle East, moreover,
lack regional courts entirely. Given these problems, this Comment does not further address the
capacity of regional courts to resolve AWS disputes. It simply notes that they aight provide an
option for resolving disputes in which countries subject to their jurisdiction develop AWSs and
use (or, more precisely, commit war crimes with) them intra-regionally.
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operator."25 A hypothetical example is a drone that could take cues from its
surroundings and operate without the involvement of a remotely located pilot or
crew. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has classified these types of systems as
"human-out-of-the-loop weapons" because they are capable of making decisions
without further human input after activation.26
Fully autonomous systems mark a significant departure from prevailing
automated weapons systems, such as remotely controlled drones and automated
defense systems. 27 Remotely controlled systems, for example, require human
input after activation to select a target or deliver force. Individuals operate these
systems at a distance, which could be thousands of miles away. 28 Remotely
controlled systems make up the majority of currently deployed military robots,
with the Predator and Reaper drones employed in Afghanistan and Pakistan
serving as prominent examples. 29 HRW calls these systems "human-in-the-loop
weapons" because the machines cannot make a decision without a human
command.3 0
A "semi-autonomous" or "automated" system, meanwhile, is a system that,
"once activated, is intended to only engage individual targets or specific target
groups that have been selected by a human operator." 31 It carries out these
functions "within preprogrammed parameters without the requirement for a
command from a human."3 2 Such systems are often used as defense sentries that

25

U.S. DEP'T OF DF., DIRECTIVE 3000.09: AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS
13 (Nov. 21, 2012),

available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000 09.pdf [hereinafter DOD DIRECTIVE
3000.09]. Consistent with the literature, this Comment defines a "weapons system" to include
both the weapon itself and any items associated with its deployment. See Schmitt & Thurnher,
supra note 8, at 234. "AWS" is used as shorthand for both an individual weapon and a complete
system. See id. at 234 n.11.
26

LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 2.

27

"Autonomy" refers to the "ability of a machine to operate without human supervision." Id. at 6.
See Stewart, supra note 14, at 276.

28
29

See Kastan, supra note 8, at 49. Both systems consist of several unmanned aircrafts controlled by a
pilot from a ground station and equipped with sensors and weapons, which crew members
operate
from the same
station. See U.S. AIR FORCE, A(Q-9
Reaper Factsbeet
(Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104470/
mq-9-reaper.aspx;
U.S.
AIR FORCE, MQ-lB Predator Factsheet (July
20, 2010),
http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/I04469/mq-1bpredator.aspx.

30

LosiNG HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 2.
DOD DIRIEcTIvE, 3000.09, supra note 25, at 14; see also LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 9
(referring to these systems as "automated").
Stewart, supra note 14, at 276.

31
32
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respond automatically if they detect an incoming threat.33 States have also
employed them for intelligence and surveillance purposes as well.34 HRW refers
to these as "human-on-the-loop weapons" because the machines can
independently make decisions, but a human operator sets limits on those
decisions."
The key distinction between AWSs, on the one hand, and remotely
operated or semi-autonomous systems, on the other, is that AWSs will operate
with "full" autonomy. That is, an AWS decides completely on its own what
actions it will take while the other systems exhibit lesser degrees of autonomy
that are subject to varying levels of human oversight.36 It is true that AWSs will
require a human to program and deploy them initially, but these human actions
are much less substantial than those required for the less autonomous systems.3
AWSs offer at least five advantages over these other systems. First, their
computing capabilities are expected to surpass those of other systems in terms
of speed and strength," enabling them to make tough decisions in a variety of
complex scenarios through adaptation and learning.39 Their enhanced computing
capacities will also allow them to complete the targeting process much more
quickly than remotely piloted aircrafts, facilitating more rapid air support for
ground personnel.40 Second, AWSs will impose lower personnel costs than
drone systems, which require pilots, sensor operators, weapons technicians,
intelligence analysts, and other crew members to function properly.4' Third, they
will avoid the dangers of cyber-attack from which remotely operated systems
33

See Schmitt & Thurnher, sapra note 8, at 236. The U.S. Navy's Phalanx Close-In Weapon System
(CIWS), for instance, provides naval warships with defense capabilities against aerial threats by
automatically detecting and engaging them. See U.S. NAvy, MK-15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System
(CIWS) Fact Sheet (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact-display.asp?
cid=2100&tid=487&ct=2 (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).

34

The U.S. Global Hawk, for instance, engages in these types of activities. See U.S. AIR FORcU, RQ-4
Global Hawk Fact Sheet (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/
tabid/224/Article/104516/rq-4-global-hawk.aspx
(last visited Nov. 18, 2014). Its "flight
commands are controlled by onboard systems without recourse to a human operator," but
humans still set the parameters of its operations. Stewart, supra note 14, at 276.

35

LosING HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 2.

36

See Stewart, supra note 14, at 276 (explaining that remotely controlled systems require an operator
who operates the unmanned vehicle at a distance "by some form of direct radio signal," whereas
automated systems operate strictly within "preprogrammed parameters"); see also Schmitt &
Thurnher, supra note 8, at 235-36 (explaining the differences between the various systems).

37

See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 235.

38

See id. at 239-40.

39

See id.

40

See Kastan, supra note 8, at 54.
See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 237.

41
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suffer. Specifically, remotely operated systems run the risk that an enemy will cut
the communications link between the remote pilot and the unmanned aircraft.4 2
Without a need to communicate with a ground station, AWSs avoid this pitfall.
Fourth, AWSs will be able to both stay on assignment for longer periods than
manned machines and perform tasks that humans would prefer to avoid.43
Finally, AWSs promise to reduce human casualties and mental health problems
for soldiers by removing them from the battlefield.' In sum, these systems will
provide for "faster, cheaper, better mission accomplishment; longer range,
greater persistence, longer endurance, higher precision; [and] faster target
engagement," making them superior to other technologies. 5
Despite these benefits, no country has developed an AWS yet,46 but
military policy documents demonstrate that states are moving in that direction.47

The U.S. Department of Defense, for instance, has set out protocols for
designing, testing, fielding, and employing AWSs.48 Likewise, the U.K. has
expressed a desire to develop this technology,4 9 and several other countriesdisplaying an enthusiasm for increased weapon autonomy-have rapidly
developed the precursors to AWSs."
Given this increasing interest in AWSs, some experts have predicted that
the technology necessary to make them work could be developed within a few
42

See id. at 238.

43

See Kastan, supra note 8, at 54.

44

See Tyler D. Evans, At War with the Robots: Autonomous Wfeapon Systems and the Martens Clause, 41
HOFSTRA L. Riv. 697, 708-09 (2013).

45

RONALD ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS 30 (2009).

46

See LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 3.

47

See id.; Stewart, supra note 14, at 277-80; Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 236-37. See, for
example, OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., THE UNMANNED SYSTEMS
INTEGRATED
ROADMAP
FY2011-2036
5,
45-51
(2011),
available at
https://
info.publicintelligence.net/DoD-UAS-2011-2036.pdf, OFFICE OF THE SIc'Y OF DEF., U.S. DEP'T
OF DEF.,
UNMANNED
SYSTEMS
ROADMAP 2007-2032
49, 54 (2007), available at
https://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/usroadmap2007.pdf; OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DE.,
U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS ROADMAP 2005-2030 52 (2005), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uav roadmap2005.pdf; U.S. AIR FORCE, UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT PLAN 2009-2047 50-51 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/program/collect/uas_2009.pdf.

48

See DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 25, at 1.

49

See U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE U.K. APPROACH TO UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 6-7
(Mar. 30, 2011), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment-data/file/33711 / 20110505JDN-211_UAS-v2U.pdf.

so

See Stewart, supra note 14, at 280-81 (observing, for instance, that Israel, South Korea, and China
have developed remotely controlled or semi-autonomous weapons); see albo Schmitt & Thurnher,
supra note 8, at 238 n.26 (noting that even terrorist organizations have shown the potential to
obtain and possibly develop autonomous technologies).
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decades." The chief scientist for the U.S. Air Force estimated that "by 2030
machine capabilities will have increased to the point that humans will have
become the weakest component in a wide array of systems."52 The U.K. Ministry
of Defence even more optimistically predicted that AWSs could actually be
available by 2025." Regardless of the specific timeline, the development of these
weapons, although likely to proceed gradually, 54 is widely regarded both by
scholars and the defense industry as inevitable."
III. THE ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEM
The ability of AWSs to operate without human oversight gives rise to the
accountability problem. Specifically, if states begin to employ these weapons
routinely, some of them will inevitably violate international law." When this
happens, "people [will] want to see someone held accountable."5 Accountability
is essential in international law to deter and prevent violations and thus to
protect potential victims of human rights abuses, war crimes, and the like." In
the context of war in particular, a fundamental condition of engaging in a just
war is the ability to attribute moral and legal responsibility to someone who
commits a war crime." Most just war principles assume that any violators will be
subject to liability, for the absence of liability would render these principles

51

Seefor example, LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 8.

52

U.S. AIR FORCE CHIEF SCIENTIST, TECHNOLOGY HoRIZONS: A VISION FOR AIR FORCE SCIENCE
available at
2010),
15,
(May
131
2010-2030
DURING
TECHNOLOGY
&
2
http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/AFTechnologyHorizons 0l02030.pdf.

s3

See U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 49, at 4-13, 6-8.

5

See Marchant et al., supra note 19, at 276.

ss

See, for example, Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 231; Kastan, supra note 8, at 52; LOSING
HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 6; Stewart, supra note 14, at 281; Sparrow, supra note 5, at 63.

56

See LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 42 ("Given the challenges [AWSsl present to adherence to
international humanitarian law ... it is inevitable that they will at some point kill or injure
civilians."); Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 279 ("Mhe use of [AWSs] in certain
circumstances would be lawful under the law of armed conflict, whereas in others it would not.");
Stewart, supra note 14, at 290 ("[E]ven the most ardent supporters of [AWSs] do not argue that
breaches can be completely removed."); Kastan, supra note 8, at 59 ("As with many complex
systems, an AWS will likely fail [to follow international law] at one point or another.").

57

LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 42.

58

See Heyns, supra note 12, 'l 75.

59

See Sparrow, supra note 5, at 67 (arguing that the ability to attribute moral and legal responsibility
to someone is a fundamental requirement of a just war); see also LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 6,
at 42 n.169 ("Individual responsibility also stems from foundational notions of just war theory.

Indeed, just war principles are formulated to govern individual decision-makers, who must accept
responsibility for the deaths they cause in war.").
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ineffective,o creating "disastrous consequences for the ways in which wars are
likely to be fought."6 1 Indeed, some scholars have argued that the inability to
hold someone responsible for war crimes caused by certain weapons is one
reason why those weapons have been banned.62
With less autonomous systems, the accountability problem does not arise.
Remotely-controlled systems require a human pilot to take a direct role in
determining the actions of a device.63 Likewise, programmers of automated
weapons have much more control over the types of threats to which the system
will respond. 64 These individuals can thus be held directly liable for crimes
committed by their weapons.6 1 With AWSs, by contrast, humans will only
program the artificial intelligence and input general command data, but neither
of these actions will necessarily lead to a given outcome.6 6 This makes it difficult
to assign blame for an AWS's conduct to a specific person. 7

60

61
62

63

64

65

See Sparrow, supra note 5, at 67 ("The assumption and/or allocation of responsibility is also vital
in order for the principles of jus in bello to take hold at all."); see also Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P.
Bialke, A/-Qaeda &'rTaliban Unlawful Combatant Detainees, Unlanful Bellgereny, and the International
Laiws ofArmed Conflict, 55 A.F. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004) (explaining that the law of war "protect[s]
noncombatants by providing all combatants an unambiguous positive incentive to constrain their
behavior as well as the potential of future punishment for failing to do so").
Sparrow, supra note 5, at 67.
See, for example. id. ("If the nature of a weapon, or other means of war fighting, is such that it is
typicaly impossible to identify or hold individuals responsible for the casualties that it causes[,]
then it is contrary to this important requirement of jus in bello.") (emphasis in original); see also
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S 211 (banning the use of
land mines).
See sources cited supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (describing how remotely controlled
systems operate).
See sources cited supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (describing how automated systems
operate).
See Stewart, supra note 14, at 290 ("The tele-operator of remotely controlled vehicles or even the
command programmer for automated equipment can both be seen as having direct roles in
determining the actions of the devices they control. They are capable of direct responsibility, even
if that control is exercised at distance.").

66

See id. ("Neither the programming nor the command data inputted to these vehicles prior to their
deployment on a particular operation will necessarily result in a specific outcome in response to
any given set of circumstances.").

67

See id. ("Absent the aberrant behavior of either the data or command programmers ... it would
be almost impossible to attribute the autonomous system's behavior directl to a particular
human.") (emphasis in original); see also LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 42 ("['Ihere is no fair
and effective way to assign legal responsibility for unlawful acts committed by fully autonomous
weapons."); Sparrow, supra note 5 at 73 ("[A]s machines become more autonomous a point will
be reached where those who order their deployment can no longer be properly held responsible
for their actions.").
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A. Proposed Options for Individual Accountability
To get around this problem, scholars have chiefly identified two individuals
who might be held accountable for AWS violations: the commanding officer and
the designer or manufacturer." As will be seen, however, critics have rightly
identified a number of flaws with each of these options.
1. Commanding-officer liability.
The first option is the commanding officer who authorizes the deployment
of an AWS. Under the principle of "command responsibility," a commander is
responsible for a subordinate's crimes if there is: "(1) a senior-subordinate
relationship; (2) actual or constructive notice of the impending crime; [and] (3)
failure to take measures to prevent it."" The point of this doctrine is to
encourage superiors to more effectively control and monitor the conduct of
subordinates and thereby deter harmful behavior.70 AWS defenders argue that
this logic could apply to AWS violations as well. Indeed, the U.S. Department of
Defense has already provided that "[p]ersons who authorize the use of, direct
the use of, or operate autonomous ...

weapon systems must do so with

appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties,
weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement."" This implies
that if a commander knows or should have known that a deployed AWS will

69

See, for example, Sparrow, supra note 5, at 69-71 (evaluating the viability of commander and
programmer liability); LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 42-44; Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note
8, at 277-78 (arguing for commander liability). A final option advanced in the literature is to hold
the machine itself liable for its crimes. See,for example, Krishnan, supra note 19, at 105. While the
concept of holding inanimate objects liable for injuries they cause has both historical roots and
modern formulations, see Kastan, supra note 8, at 68-69, this option would probably not produce
a deterrent effect unless the AWS could be programmed to "feel" the consequences of its actions.
See LOSING HUMANITY, suqpra note 6, at 45. Even if it could be so programmed, victims would
probably not view the punishment of a machine as adequate to satiate their need for justice. See id.
Kastan, suqpra note 8, at 67 (citing Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August

7o

1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (addition in original) [hereinafter Additional Protocol I).
See Kastan, supra note 8, at 68 ("The purpose of... punishing a group, or a superior, for the

71

actions of another . . . goes to the heart of one of the purposes of punishment: deterrence. It is
thought that by enacting these sanctions, even if you cannot directly target the wrongdoer, you
can control it through those better situated to monitor the erring entity."); Sherrie L. RussellBrown, The Last line of Defense: The Doctrine of Command Responsibity and Gender Crimes in Armed
Conflict, 22 Wis. INT'l. L.J. 125, 128-29 (2004) ("A purpose of the [command responsibility]
doctrine is the deterrence of violations of international humanitarian law.") (collecting sources);
Matthew Lippman, Humanitarian larw: The Uncertain Contours of Command Rerponsibiliy, 9 TUlSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 90 (2001) ("Command culpability is designed to encourage military
commanders .. . to control the conduct of combatants.").
DOD DIRcTivi 3000.09, supra note 25, at 3. See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 277-78

68

(advocating commander liability).
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violate international law, he will be held accountable for the crime.7 2 Such
liability would encourage the commander to exert more control over the AWS,
deploying it only in ways that minimize risks.
This doctrine applies well for commanders who deploy a weapon knowing
that such deployment creates a grave risk of an international crime. If an officer
deploys a weapon knowing that a malfunction has disrupted its ability to
distinguish between citizens and combatants, for example, it would make sense
to hold him liable under a theory of command responsibility. It is not clear,
however, that commanders will consistently know of these types of risks,
especially because they themselves will presumably not have programmed or
designed the weapon." Where they do not recognize until after deployment that
an AWS poses a risk, moreover, they would not be able to reprogram it to
prevent the violation.74 As systems become more autonomous, their actions in
the field and the risks they create will grow even more difficult to predict,"
limiting the applicability of traditional command responsibility.
To hold a commander responsible for an AWS action that he could neither
control nor foresee would thus go beyond the traditional scope of command
responsibility." It would also cut against ethical notions about criminal liability.
If commanders are not held strictly liable for their subordinates' actions, it seems
"unfair to impose liability on commanders for their fully autonomous weapons,"
as these weapons will exercise a similar degree of autonomy.7
2. Designer or manufacturer liability.
Another option is to hold the designer or manufacturer strictly liable when
its AWS violates international law." This option would treat any AWS crime as a
legal accident, and manufacturers would be required to pay for any damages
caused and to compensate victims or their families." This, the argument goes,

72

See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 277.

73

See LOSING

74

See id.

75

See Sparrow, supranote 5, at 70-71.
See Additional Protocol 1, supra note 69, art. 86(2) (limiting command responsibility to cases where
the commander "knew, or had information which should have enabled [her] to conclude in the
circumstances at the time, that [her subordinate] was committing or was going to commit such a
breach [of international law] and if [she] did not take all feasible measures within [her] power to
prevent or repress the breach").

76

HUMANITY,

supranote 6, at 43.

77

LosING HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 42.

78

See id. at 43-44 (exploring this option).
See Krishnan, supra note 19, at 103-04 (describing how manufacturer liability would operate in
theory).

79
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would encourage manufacturers to make AWSs as safe as possible." As the
weapon is presumably not meant to commit such violations, placing the blame
on the entity that designed or manufactured it has some intuitive appeal," but
AWS opponents have identified a couple of problems with a strict liability
approach. First, in the defense context, weapons manufacturers are rarely held
accountable for design defects,82 especially when they notify the purchasers that
the AWS may attack the wrong target.8 3 Second, this option would require the
individual victims to initiate lawsuits against corporate manufacturers of AWSs.84
Victims who are often impoverished and geographically displaced are unlikely to
sue these companies, which are likely to possess much greater resources.85
In addition to these problems, strict liability for AWS producers suffers
from yet another, more problematic flaw that critics have overlooked.
Specifically, holding these companies strictly liable would not necessarily
incentivize them to produce weapons that are more likely to comply with
international law. Instead, producers could simply charge higher prices for
AWSs to offset the liability risks, thus passing their increased liability costs on to
the state consumers. After all, it is likely that only those states with large defense
budgets will be able to afford these weapons in the first place, rendering the
demand for AWSs fairly inelastic. Relatively slight increases in price to
compensate for the liability risks are therefore not likely to deter purchases.86 It
follows that, once producers have created a weapon that states are willing to buy,
s0

See id.

81

See Sparrow, supra note 5, at 69 ("Given that the weapon is presumably not supposed to behave in
this way, it is tempting to insist that the fault lies with the person(s) who designed and/or
programmed the weapon, and that they should be held responsible for its destructive result.").
See Krishnan, supra note 19, at 104. ("It rarely happens that the manufacturers of weapons are
held responsible for any accidents caused by poor design, which has many reasons.").

82
83

84
85

86

See Sparrow, supra note 5, at 69 (observing that, when AWS manufacturers inform state buyers
that the weapon may attack the wrong target, the manufacturers "can no longer be held
responsible, [sic] should this occur"); Beard, supra note 21, at 647 ("IP]rivate weapons
manufacturers are not generally punished for how individuals or governments use their weapons,
particularly if the manufacturers are careful in disclosing (up front) to military purchasers any risks
of malfunctions.").
See LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 44 ("[Piroduct liability requires a civil suit, which puts the
onus on victims.").
See id. ("it is unrealistic to expect civilian victims of war, who are often poverty stricken and
geographically displaced by conflict, to sue for relief against a manufacturer in a foreign court.");
Heyns, supra note 12, 79. This problem also exists for individual suits against states. See infra
Section IV.B.
Due to the relatively inelastic demand for AWSs, it is unlikely that AWS manufacturers would exit
the market when faced with strict liability, and placing liability on states would cause those
countries in the market for AWSs to internalize the full cost of decision-making, thus potentially
leading to fewer risky or populated-area AWS deployments.
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the prospect of liability would not necessarily incentivize them to make their
product safer. The state buyers, meanwhile, would never internalize the cost of
those war crimes committed by their own AWSs because the increased price of
the weapons would spread that cost among all buyers. Consequently, no single
buyer would have an incentive to minimize the risk of AWS crimes. Because of
this cost-spreading effect, states that use their AWSs rarely or carefully to
minimize the risk of war crimes would subsidize states that use them with less
regard for that risk-thus discouraging risk minimization by states."
A negligence approach to designer or manufacturer liability also has its
flaws. While individual designers "lay the foundation" for an AWS's actions,
"the weapon would still be autonomous," so even the most careful designer
"could not predict with complete certainty the decisions [an AWS] might
eventually make in a complex battlefield scenario."" Indeed, the entire concept
of autonomy presupposes that AWSs will take actions other than those that its
designers predicted or intended." As AWSs learn from their experiences and
surroundings, their decisions would depend on much more than the original
programming." Thus, because AWSs will be designed precisely for independent
decision-making, finding the manufacturer negligent in any given case may prove
impossible in practice (for lack of control or proximate causation).
There are thus significant legal, ethical, and practical problems with each of
the proposed options for individual accountability in the event of an AWS
crime. As each of these options seems to be either "inappropriate or
impractical," a "responsibility vacuum" is likely to emerge, which would grant
"impunity for all [AWS] use."91

87

AWS critics have advanced a different argument, claiming that strict manufacturer liability for
international law violations might deter companies from producing these weapons in the first
place, depriving states of a potentially valuable military resource. See LOSING HUMANITY, supra
note 6, at 44 ("It is highly unlikely that any company would produce and sell weapons, which are
inherently dangerous, knowing the firm could be held strictly liable for any use that violates
international humanitarian law."). This argument fails, however, to account for the possibility
identified here-that AWS suppliers could simply raise the price of their weapons to offset the
risk of liability.

88

LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 43.

89

See Sparrow, supra note 5, at 70 ("[TI]he possibility that an autonomous system will make choices
other than those predicted and encouraged by its programmers is inherent in the claim that it is
autonomous.').

90

See id. ("If it has sufficient autonomy that it learns from its experience and surroundings then it
may make decisions which reflect these as much, or more than, its initial programming.").

91

Heyns, supra note 12,
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B. The Superiority of State Liability
At least in theory, state accountability has the potential to correct this
problem. As an initial matter, the concept of state responsibility is well
established in international law.92 The International Law Commission93 (ILC)
articulated the rule behind this concept in its Articles on the Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Responsibility Articles),94 which
provide that "[e]very internationally wrongful act of a State entails the
international responsibility of that State."" A state engages in an "internationally
wrongful action" when an act or omission "(a) is attributable to the State under
international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of
the State."" An action is attributable to a state when it is conducted by an
"organ" of the state," which almost certainly includes the military as well as
intelligence agencies." Therefore, assuming that AWSs operate under the

92

See Catherine Tinker, Responsibility for Biological Diversity Conservation Under International Law, 28
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 777, 784 (1995) ("It is well established in international law that breach of
a rule of international law entails state responsibility for an internationally wrongful act.") (citing
Chorzow Factory Case, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 27-28 (Sept. 13)).

93

The U.N. General Assembly created this commission in 1947 "to help the progressive
development and codification of international law." Lakshman Guruswamy, State Reponsibility in
Promoting Environmental Corporate Accountability, 21 FORDHAM ENvri. L. REv. 209, 209-10 (2010)
(internal citation omitted).

94

Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, [2001] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 26, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1
[hereinafter Responsibility Articles]. The U.N. General
Assembly has commended the Responsibility Articles on a number of occasions and decided in
2013 to consider the question of a convention on the basis of the Articles at its seventy-first
session in 2016. See G.A. Res. 68/104, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/104 (Dec. 16, 2013). The ICJ has
also declared that at least some parts of the Articles reflect customary international law on this
issue. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43,
385, 407 (Feb. 26).

9s

Responsibility Articles, supra note 94, art. I. For an in-depth analysis of the Responsibility Articles,
see generally Daniel Bodansky & John R. Crook, Symposium: The ILC's State Responsibility Aricles,
96 AM.J. INT'L L. 773 (2002).
Responsibility Articles, supranote 94, art. II.

96

97
98

Id. art. IV(1).
See Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 10 P 34, at
84, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/reports/english/a-56_10.pdf
(observing that "a 'State organ covers all the individual or collective entities which make up the
organization of the State and act on its behalf") [hereinafter Articles Commentary]; see also
Responsibility Articles, supra note 94, art. IV(1) (rendering conduct attributable to the state
"whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever
position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the
central government or of a territorial unit of the State"). The Articles Commentary accompanied
one of the earliest drafts of the Articles and is "probably of greater general significance and value
than the draft Articles themselves." Dayna L. Kaufman, Don't Do What I Say, Do What I Mean!:
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authority of these institutions, their actions would be attributable to the state.
Furthermore, since conduct "constitutes a breach of an international obligation
of [a] State" when it violates "a clearly-defined treaty obligation or an
unequivocally recognized norm of customary law,"" a state could be culpable
under the Responsibility Articles if its AWS violates established norms of
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) or International Human Rights Law
(IHRL).1oo
From a legal standpoint, then, state responsibility is a viable option, at least
in the abstract. Normatively, moreover, it is preferable to commander, designer,
or manufacturer liability. First, the primary purpose of the Responsibility
Articles-to "increase[ ] compliance with international obligations"-applies in
the context of AWS crimes.101 If states realize that they will be held accountable
for the war crimes of their AWSs, they have an incentive, first, to weigh the
potential liability costs against the benefits of using AWSs at all and, second, to
make sure the weapons they do use are consistently unlikely to violate
international law. The prospect of liability would draw attention to the fact that
the widespread, frequent use of AWSs would almost certainly result in at least
some violations of international law.1 02 Should states choose to use AWSs in
spite of these risks, liability would give them a reason at the purchase and
deployment stages to ensure that their AWSs will comply with international law,
because the states themselves would internalize all the costs of crimes
committed by their weapons rather than having the cost spread among all buyers
via producer strict liability." Specifically, the state could incentivize the
manufacturers and designers to produce safe AWSs by setting standards for an
Assessing a State's Responsibilty for the Exploits of Individuals Acting in Conformrit with a Statementfrom a
leadofState, 70 FORDHAtM L. Ruv. 2603, 2610 (2002) (citation omitted).

99

Tinker, supra note 92, at 784-85. See Articles Commentary, supra note 98, at 128 ("State
responsibility can arise from breaches of bilateral obligations or of obligations owed to some
States or to the international community as a whole. It can involve relatively minor infringements
as well as the most serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general
international law.").

1oo For an explanation of how an AWS might violate IHL or IHRL, see infra Section IV.
101 Alan Nissel, The ILCArticles on State Responsibility: Between Self-Help and Sokdaity, 38 N.Y.U.J. INTi.
L. & Poi.. 355, 369 (2006).
102 See discussion supra note 56 and accompanying text.
103

Although the state would likely have no more control over an AWS once it is in the field than the
commander, designer, or manufacturer, see LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 43 (observing that,
once an AWS has been deployed, "the commander would be unable to reprogram it in real time
to prevent the crime because it was designed to operate with complete autonomy"); Sparrow,
supra note 5, at 70 ("ITihe possibility that an autonomous system will make choices other than
those predicted and encouraged by its programmers is inherent in the claim that it is
autonomous."), the other two options could each only ensure compliance at one of these stages
(commander at deployment; manufacturer/designer before purchase).
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acceptable purchase. At the same time, it could limit commanders' discretion in
the deployment of these weapons through policy measures. Thus, because the
state could both require better design and manufacture and limit commander
discretion, it is in the best position to guard against international AWS crimes
throughout the entire process. As such, it makes the most sense for the state to
bear the liability risk.104
Morally speaking, moreover, the state is arguably the most culpable actor in
the use of AWSs that unforeseeably violate international law (that is, absent
wrongful intent or negligence on the part of an individual). After all, it would be
the state that makes the overarching decision to utilize AWSs in the first place.
Given the risks inherent in employing such weapons, this choice renders the
state more culpable in a moral sense than the producers, who merely respond to
a demand created by the state, and the commanders, who merely carry out the
policy decision the state made. By exerting control over both the purchase and
deployment phases of AWS use, the state becomes the actor best suited to
internalize the costs of its decision-making and, therefore, the most
blameworthy.
For related reasons, a strict liability regime would be preferable in practice
to a negligence regime in assigning responsibility for AWS crimes to states.
Commentators have argued that strict liability is often superior to negligence
where a particular activity creates nonreciprocal risks and benefits."0 '
Nonreciprocal risks exist if an injurer's action "imposes a risk unilaterally on the
victim in situations where the victim's activity does not impose a similar risk on
the injurer."10 ' Similarly, nonreciprocal benefits exist where the injurer receives a

104

105

106

This argument is a variation on the "least-cost-avoider" theory in the field of law and economics,
which states that "the party with the least cost available precaution should be given the incentive
to avoid the risk by having liability imposed on him or her in the event the risk materializes."
David W. Barnes & Rosemary McCool, Reasonable Care in Tort Law The Duty to Take Corrective
Precautions, 36 ARiz. L. RIv. 357, 365 (1994). See generaly Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, 1jability Rules, and Inalienabiity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. Riv. 1089
(1972); GuIoo CALABRISIS, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND EcONOMic ANALYSIS
(1970).
See, for example, Kenneth W. Simons, The Restatement (1hird) of Torts and TraditionalStrict Iiability:
Robust Rationales, Slender Doctrines, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1355, 1361-68 (2009).
Id. at 1361-62. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM 5 20 cmt. j (2010) (explaining that "principles of reciprocity" dictate that strict liability
should not apply to activities in common usage because the risks such activities create "are
imposed by the many on each other"), 22 cmt. d (2010) ("[Owning wild animals is an unusual
activity, engaged in by a few, which imposes on others significant risks that are themselves
unusual and distinctive.") [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. For the most prominent defense of the
nonreciprocal risk rationale, see generally George P. Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Tbeory, 85
HARv. L. REv. 537 (1972).
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benefit from his activity that the victim does not share in equal proportion."" A
state's use of AWSs creates both nonreciprocal risks and benefits. In all
likelihood, individuals in areas where the state deploys an AWS will bear virtually
all of the risk that the weapon might commit a war crime, as they will be the
ones who suffer if it does so, even though they do not impose a similar risk on
the state. The state, meanwhile, is the primary beneficiary of the weapon's usage,
enjoying the many tactical and resource advantages that AWSs generateadvantages that victims will not experience.' Shifting the losses created by a
state's use of AWSs from the victims to the states "would improve the
distribution of burden and benefit" because it would force the state to
compensate victims of AWS crimes.10' Strict liability is therefore suitable in this
context.110

IV.

AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

There is currently no law or treaty that directly covers the regulation of
AWSs or autonomous systems more generally."' As such, a state's use of AWSs
would need only comply with the broader body of international law pertaining to
armed conflict and human rights.1 12 As different laws apply in different contexts,

1o7

See Gregory C. Keating, Strict Idability and the Mitigation of Moral Luck, 2 J. ETHICS & Soc. PHIL. 1,
17 (2006) ("It is presumptively reasonable-presumptively fair-for the burdens of a risky activity
to be borne by those who benefit from it. Prima facie, burden and benefit should be
proportional."); see also Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise liabity and Common Law Strict
liabiity, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2001) ("[Enterprise liability [a form of strict liability]
expresses the maxim that those who profit from the imposition of risk should bear the costs of
the accidents that are a price of their profits."); Simons, supra note 105, at 1363 (arguing that "[i]t
is the private benefit to the actor that justifies the duty to compensate" in some strict liability
regimes); RESTATEMENT, supra note 106, § 20 cmt. e (describing blasting as the paradigmatic
example of an activity subject to strict liability partly because "the defendant chooses to engage in
blasting for reasons of its own benefit").

108

See discussion supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (outlining the benefits of AWS use).

109 Keating, Strict Idability and the Miligation of MoralLuck, supra note 107, at 17.
11o

In addition, strict liability is appropriate where there is an "inability to eliminate the risk of
accident by the exercise of due care." Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d
1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.). This situation would likely exist when a state uses AWSs
because crimes may occur even if the relevant weapon was produced and deployed in a
reasonable manner, in which case the state would not be guilty of negligence. Strict liability would
thus "give [the state] an incentive, missing in a negligence regime, to experiment with methods of
preventing accidents that involve not greater exertions of care, assumed to be futile, but instead
relocating, changing, or reducing (perhaps to the vanishing point) the activity giving rise to the
accident." Id. This provides yet another reason to hold states strictly liable for the crimes of their
AWSs.

ni

See Marchant et al., supra note 19, at 289.

112

See Kastan, supra note 8, at 54.
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the specific laws that would apply to a given AWS crime will depend on the
overall circumstances of that AWS's use.
International law permits states to use force in three contexts."' First,
states may use force to engage in either individual or collective self-defense.114
Second, they may conduct military operations if the U.N. Security Council
authorizes force to maintain peace and security."' Finally, they may use force to
a lesser extent in the law enforcement context.116 IHL, also known as the Law of
Armed Conflict (LOAC), governs the first two categories, with IHRL filling in
any gaps.' IHRL captures any use of force that falls outside the context of an
armed conflict, including force employed in law enforcement operations.118
A. Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law
The main purpose of IHL is to limit the grievous effects of armed
conflict."' It is derived largely from an expansive body of customary decisional
law but is also embodied in the Hague Convention of 1907, the four post-World
War II Geneva Conventions, and their two Additional Protocols of 1977,120 a
of which have achieved the status of customary international law.'
IHL applies to both international armed conflicts, which occur when two
or more states are involved in an armed dispute, and non-international armed
conflicts, which occur when a state responds with force to violence initiated by
non-state actors.122 IHL allows states to use lethal force against designated

113

114

See Molly McNab & Megan Matthews, Clarifing the Law Relating to Unmanned Drones and the Use of
Force: The Relationships Between Human Rzghts, Self-Defense, Armed Conflict, and International
HumanitarianLaw, 39 DENV.J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 661, 664-65 (2011) (laying out the framework of
international law governing the use of force).
See U.N. Charter, art. 51; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (une 27); McNab & Matthews, supra note 113, at 664.

115
116

See U.N. Charter, arts. 42, 51; McNab & Matthews, supra note 113, at 664.
See McNab & Matthews, supranote 113, at 669.

117

See id. at 683.

118

See id. at 668. There is a great deal of debate on which body of law, IHL or IHRL, governs
counter-terrorism operations. This debate is beyond the scope of this Comment, which simply
notes that an AWS crime resulting from counter-terrorism operations could potentially lead to
liability under either body of law.

119

See Marchant et al., supra note 19, at 294-95 n.76.
See Thomas Michael McDonnell, Sow What You Reap? Using Predatorand Reaper Drones to Carry Out
Assassinations or TargetedKillings of Suspected Islamic Terrorists, 44 GEo. WASH. INT'L L. Riv. 243, 270
(2012).
See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 L.C.J. 226, 1[79
(uly 8); see also Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 244-45.

120

121

122

See McNab & Matthews, supra note 113, at 684-85.
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combatants.'23 Some level of civilian casualties is also permissible so long as the
underlying military acts comply with certain principles.124
Two IHL principles would likely serve as the primary foundations of state
liability for AWS crimes. The first of these, "distinction," is designed to protect
"the civilian population and civilian objects" and thus requires states to
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.1 25 By extension, states
may not target civilians or use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing
between civilian and military targets.'26 This second prohibition is meant to bar
attacks that are equally as likely to kill non-combatants as combatants.127
While simple in theory, this principle raises some practical difficulties. For
instance, some targets, like a bridge, may have both civilian and military
purposes, so it is unclear whether an attack on such a target would violate the
principle of distinction.128 Such difficulties make distinction the "the greatest
hurdle to the legal deployment of AWSs,"l29 as currently no artificial intelligence
system can distinguish between combatants and civilians.'" Consequently, the
distinction principle could easily legitimize holding a state strictly liable for the
crimes of its AWSs. For example, if an AWS, with or without authorization,
openly attacks a civilian population not directly participating in hostilities, a clear
violation of IHL has occurred."' Likewise, the mere deployment of an AWS
incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets would also
violate the IHL principle of distinction, regardless of whether it results in an
attack on civilians.
The second principle, "proportionality," bars attacks that "may be expected
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."l 3 2 Essential to this principle
is the concept of "excessiveness," but there is no uniformly accepted definition

123

See id. at 683-84.

124

See id

125

Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 121,

128

78.
See id; see also Additional Protocol 1, supra note 69, art. 51(2).
See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 253; Kastan, supra note 8, at 55; Marchant et al., supra
note 19, at 296.
See Kastan, supranote 8, at 55.

129

Id. at 59.

130

131

See Noel Sharkey, Grounds for Discrimination:Autonomous Robot Weapons, RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS
86, 88 (Oct. 2008).
See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 252.

132

Additional Protocol 1, supra note 69, art. 51(5)(b).

126
127
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of the term."' It is commonly accepted, however, that excessiveness
determinations go beyond mere comparisons between the number of civilian
and combatant casualties that result from an attack.134 Instead, excessiveness is
determined on a case-by-case basis, considering the reasonableness of the action
in light of its objective and the anticipated collateral damage.' The greater the
advantage expected to result from a given action, the more collateral damage
IHL will tolerate.136
The ban on excessive collateral damage could supply a foundation for
holding a state strictly liable in the AWS context. The deployment of an AWS
lacking the capacity to make the relevant proportionality calculations, for
instance, would result in liability if the weapon ultimately creates an excessive
amount of civilian casualties. Another fairly easy case would be one in which a
technical malfunction prevents a weapon from making the needed collateral
damage calculation, and the resulting attack again produces excessive civilian
casualties. Likewise, a malfunction that causes the AWS to grossly underestimate
the expected collateral damage could result in liability, assuming the correct
calculation would deem the damage excessive. Once again, the attack would still
need to actually produce the expected damage. The hardest cases will be those
that are "close calls." For example, if one accepted algorithm would label a given
attack "excessive" but the algorithm employed by the AWS would not, it is not
clear which would govern to determine the proper threshold for a violation.
These borderline cases notwithstanding, proportionality could still serve as a
basis for state liability.
B. Autonomous Weapons and International Human
Rights Law
Few scholars have paid much attention to the IHRL implications of AWSs,
probably because the most obvious use of these weapon systems will involve
armed conflicts. As "[c]ombating terrorism is one of the primary purposes for
the employment of armed drones,"137 however, states will likely employ AWSs

133

See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 254.

134

See id. ("[Elxcessiveness is not a matter of counting civilian casualties and comparing them to the
number of enemy combatants that have been put out of action.") (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
See id. (observing that the excessiveness calculation "is the product of a case-by-case assessment
that is evaluated in terms of its reasonableness given the attendant circumstances").

135

136

See id. ("[Ihe greater the reasonably anticipated military advantage likely to accrue from an attack,
the more the law of armed conflict will tolerate the expected collateral damage.").

137

McNab & Matthews, supra note 113, at 666.
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beyond the traditional context of armed conflicts, which could very well
implicate IHRL.'
IHRL governs any action by a state outside the context of an armed
conflict.1 39 It "is designed to operate primarily in normal peacetime conditions
and . . . between a state and its citizens.""

It thus applies at minimum within the

territorial boundaries of states, requiring states that have signed the relevant
treaties to respect their citizens' human rights.14 1 The ICJ, moreover, has held
that IHRL applies to states' extraterritorial actions,' 42 so it could provide a basis
for liability in the event of an extraterritorial AWS crime.

13s

Some scholars have pointed out that counter-terrorism operations outside of a geographically
recognized zone of conflict, like the use of drones to target terrorists in Pakistan, may still fall
within the scope of IHL. Others have argued that IHRL applies to these situations. Compare,for
example, McNab & Matthews, supra note 113, at 693 ("[Ilt is debated whether terroristic activities
can rise to the level of a non-international armed conflict. . . . Thus, the legality of the responses
carried out by the U.S. and its allies against terrorists . . . remains controversial."), with Philip
Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on
Targeted Killings, IT 51-56, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28,
2010) (arguing that many of the U.S.'s counter-terrorism operations, such as its use of drones in
Pakistan, fall outside the scope of an armed conflict); Milena Sterio, The UnitedStates' Use of Drones
in the War on Terror. The (I)legality of TargetedKillings Under InternationalLaw,45 CASE W. RItS.J. INT'l.
L. 197, 203-05 (2013) (same); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Unlanfil Killing with Combat Drones: A Case
Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009, 13 (Notre Dame L. Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43,
July 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1 501144) (same);
Robert P. Barnidge, Jr., A Qualifed Defense of American Drone Attacks in Northwest Pakistan Under
InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 30 B.U. INT'L L.J. 409, 433-39 (2012) (arguing that these counterterrorism operations fall within the scope of an armed conflict); Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and
the Law ofArmed Conflict, 39 DENV.J. INT'l. L. & Poi'Y 101, 107-13 (2011) (same); Andrew C. Orr,
Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved The Status of American Drone Strikes in Pakistan Under
InternationalLaw, 44 CORNELL INT'i. L.J. 729, 742-45 (2011) (same).

139

See McNab & Matthews, supra note 113, at 668.

140

Christopher

Greenwood,

Historical Development and Legal Basis, in T-IE HANDBOOK

OF

HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMI;D CONFiCTS 1, 12 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008).
141

142

See Oona A. Hathaway et al., Which Law Governs During Armed Conflict? The Relationship Betveen
InternationalHumanitarianIsw and Human Rights Law, 96 MINN. L. Riv. 1883, 1892 (2012).
See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ. Fed'n), Summary 2008/4, 4 (Oct. 15) (holding that Articles 2 and 5
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, an IHRL treaty,
"generally appear to apply, like other provisions of instruments of that nature, to the actions of a
State party when it acts beyond its territory"). Overall, it is not clear whether IHRL applies
extraterritorially in this way. The general consensus is that IHRL applies: (1) within a ratifying
state's boundaries such that it must respect its own citizens' rights and (2) extraterritorially when a
state exercises "effective control" over a territory or individual. See Hathaway et al., supra note 141,
at 1892; Oona A. Hathaway et al., Human Rights Abroad: When Do Human Rights Treaty Obligations
Apply Extraterritorially?,43 ARiz. ST. L.J. 389, 395 (2011). The ICJ's decision notwithstanding, it is
unclear whether IHRL would apply to the use of AWSs outside the context of armed conflict, but
it seems possible.
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This body of law originates from a variety of sources.'43 The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is considered the cornerstone of
IHRL.'" This treaty protects a wide range of rights, including the rights to life,
privacy, "freedom of thought, conscience, and religion."l4 5 The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights also reflects IHRL, and it is now arguably part of
customary international law.'46
The ICCPR guarantees everyone "the inherent right to life" and warrants
that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."1 47 It also guarantees that
"[njo one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in
accordance with such procedure as are established by law."148 Together, these
guarantees imply that the state may kill someone outside its custody only if
necessary to prevent imminent harm to others.'49 Otherwise, suspected criminals
are to be prosecuted.' This "law enforcement" model and "its accompanying
due process rights" suggest that the use of AWS for targeted killings outside of

143

See Hathaway et al., snpra note 141, at 1891-92.

144

See William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights: Is
the United States StiRA Parly, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 277, 277 (1995).
David Sloss, The Domestication of InternationalHuman Rights: Non-Self Executing Declarationsand Human

145

Rights Treaties, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 129, 138 (1999) (citation omitted).

149

See Scott L. Porter, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Does It Have Enough Force of Law to
Hold "States" Party to the Far in Bosnia-Hergegovina Legally Accountable in the InternationalCourt of
justice, 3 TuLsAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 141, 152 (1995); see also Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21).
ICCPR, spra note 3, art. 6. Accord The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A,
U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 3 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR] ("Everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of person.").
ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 9. See also UDJR, supra note 147, art. 10 ("Everyone is entitled in full
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination
of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.").
See Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31

150

CARDozo L. Riv. 405, 408 (2009) ("The human rights model controls law enforcement
operations generally, and it permits the state to kill a person not in custody only if necessary to
prevent him from posing a threat of death or serious injury to others."); see also McNab &
Matthews, sipra note 113, at 672; Carla Crandall, Ready... Fire... Aim! A Case for Applying
American Due Process Princiles Before Engaging in Drone Strikes, 24 FILA. J. INT'l. L. 55, 66 (2012).
See David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Supected Terrorists:Extra-JudiialExecutions or Legitimate Means

146

147

148

of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171, 178 (2005) ("If there is credible evidence that such persons
were indeed involved in planning, promoting, aiding and abetting or carrying out terrorist acts
they should be afforded a fair trial before a competent and independent court and, if convicted,
sentenced by the court to a punishment provided by law."); see also Crandall, supra note 149, at 66.
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armed conflicts would give rise to an action even if the target were a known
terrorist.1

As such, the ICCPR may support state liability if an AWS is used to
perform an extraterritorial killing outside the context of an armed conflict. Were
the U.S. to deploy an AWS to assassinate a fugitive, for instance, that action
would almost certainly violate IHRL. As with drones,152 however, it is not clear
that every extrajudicial killing by an AWS would necessarily violate international
law. For this Comment's purposes, it suffices to recognize that in at least some
instances IHRL could provide a basis for liability.
V. STATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR AUTOMATED WEAPON
SYSTEMS' CRIMES
For a state (the offending state or offender) to be held liable for violations
of international law committed by its AWSs, there must be an entity, like a court,
to which it answers. Additionally, an adversarial party, like the state whose
citizens have suffered from the crime (the victim state) or the individual victims
themselves, must actually challenge the behavior. Whether the ICJ could provide
an effective forum for resolving interstate disputes arising from AWS use, and
whether domestic courts could do so for victim-initiated lawsuits, constitute the
focus of this section.
A. Accountability in the International Court of Justice
As individual victims will often be too poorly situated to legally confront
an offending state,'5 3 victim states will generally be better suited to bring an
action. The most appropriate forum in which they might bring suit is the ICJ.'54
151

152

153
154

Crandall, supra note 149, at 66. See also McNab & Matthews, supra note 113, at 672-73 (arguing
that the use of drones for targeted killings "implicate[s] human rights violations" even when no
individual is under imminent threat).
See McNab & Matthews, supra note 113, at 693 ("[lit remains extremely controversial as to
whether terrorism triggers law enforcement methods governed by human rights or whether it
activates the right to use force in self-defense."); Crandall, supra note 149, at 89 ("While various
commentators have suggested that ... [IHRL] can provide legitimacy to deprivations resulting
from drone strikes . . . these bodies of law have failed to generate consensus as to the legitimacy
of drone killings.").
See LosING HUMANITY, supranote 6, at 44.
Other international bodies also exist for dispute settlement in specific areas, such as the World
Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement Body for resolving trade disputes and several
international arbitration institutions for settling commercial disagreements. None of these would
provide a forum for resolving disputes over AWS crimes, as human rights violations and war
crimes fall outside their jurisdiction. The International Criminal Court, meanwhile, only has
jurisdiction over individuals, so it could not be used to hold state parties responsible for their
AWS crimes. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conf. of
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As the principal judicial organ of the U.N., one of the ICJ's primary
functions is to settle legal disputes between states.'"' Only states may submit
contentious cases for ICJ adjudication,"' and so the Court lacks jurisdiction to
deal with applications from individuals, non-governmental organizations,
corporations, or private parties. A state may still sue on behalf of its citizens
based on a wrong they suffered at another state's hands, but the dispute is
considered to be between the states.
The ICJ hears all kinds of interstate legal disputes, with no formal
restrictions on its subject-matter jurisdiction.'5 ' Despite this broad mandate, a
few types of cases make up a large portion of the ICJ's docket, with over half of
its cases involving boundary disputes."' By contrast, it has taken on relatively
few human rights cases, and those it has "have been an intermittent and not
especially important part of the Court's work.""o Similarly, the ICJ has only
rendered a few decisions that implicate IHL,1'' but a couple of those opinions
have had significant implications for IHL.162 The Court's lack of attention to

Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an ICC, art. 25, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17,
1998), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=A/CONF.1 83/9. For
a brief explanation of why regional tribunals would likely prove insufficient, see discussion supra
note 24.
155

156
157

I5s

See Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945), arts. 34-38 [hereinafter ICJ
Statute]; PracticalInformation: Frequenty Asked Questions, THE, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTIC.,
http://www.icj-cij.org/information/index.php?pl=7&p2=2
(last visited Nov. 18, 2014)
[hereinafter ICJ FAQ]. The Court also issues advisory opinions on legal matters submitted to it.
See ICJ Statute, supra, arts. 65-68.
See ICJ Statute, supra note 155, art. 34.
See generaly ICJ FAQ, supra note 155; seefor example, Ambatielos Case (Greece v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J.
10 (May 19); Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.) (second phase), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).
See John R. Crook, The InternationalCourt of Justice and Human Rights, 1 Nw. U.J. INT'L Hum. RTs. 2,
3 (2003); see also ICJ Statute, supranote 155, art. 38.

161

See Crook, supra note 158, at 3.
Id. at 7. See Adam M. Smith, Recent Developments, Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?: The "Wall
Decision" and the Troubling Rise of the ICJ as a Human Rights Court, 18 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 251, 252
(2005) (noting that the ICJ "does not have such an activist, human rights oriented history"); seefor
example, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), 2010 I.C.J. 639 (Nov. 30) (holding
that the Democratic Republic of the Congo violated the ICCPR and the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights when it unlawfully arrested and detained a Guinean businessman).
See Stephen M. Schwebel, The Roles of the Security Council and the International Court of Justice in the

162

Application of International Humanitarian Law, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L & Poi.. 731, 733-46 (1995)
(outlining cases that bore on 1HL); see, for example, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (holding that the U.S. violated
customary international law and various treaties when it trained, armed, and financed rebel forces
in Nicaragua).
See Vincent Chetail, The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to International Humanitarian

159
161

Law, 85 INT'l Riw. RED CROss 235, 235-36 (2003).
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IHRL and IHL cases does not, however, affect its jurisdiction over cases
brought under them, and so, at least in theory, it could provide a venue for
adjudicating cases involving AWS crimes.
Nevertheless, state accountability via the ICJ faces several significant
obstacles. The biggest of these is jurisdictional. Membership in the U.N. does
not automatically give the Court jurisdiction over a given state. Instead, its
jurisdiction is sharply limited to those cases in which both parties have
consented to the Court's authority.' States can so consent in three different
ways. First, both parties can sign an international agreement containing a
provision that enables them to refer disputes under that agreement to the ICJ.'"
This mechanism for consent probably will not give the Court jurisdiction over
most disputes arising from AWS crimes because the main treaties a state might
use to assert an IHL or IHRL violation do not require dispute resolution in the
ICJ."'As IHL and IHRL constitute the primary bodies of law that will apply to
AWS crimes, the failure of these agreements to mandate referral of disputes to
the ICJ means that victim and offending states will need to consent in some
other way.
Another way a state can consent to ICJ adjudication is to formally accept
the Court's jurisdiction as compulsory in the event of a dispute with another
U.N. member state. It does this by filing a declaration of consent with the
If both the victim and offending state have made such
Secretary General.'
Court
would have jurisdiction over the case. However, this
filings, then the
option will likely prove as fruitless as the first for creating jurisdiction. Roughly
two-thirds of the world's countries do not recognize the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction,'67 including a few countries that are likely to be major players in the

163

See ICJ Statute, supra note 155, arts. 34-37.

164

See id. art. 37.

165

The Hague Convention was ratified in 1907, long before the ICJ's establishment. The Geneva
Conventions, as well as Additional Protocol I, contain a recommendation that State parties
resolve disputes at the ICJ but do not mandate it. See Resolutions of the Diplomatic Conference,
Resolution 75 U.N.T.S. 21, 22 (Aug. 12, 1949); see generally Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, (Aug. 12, 1949), 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (failing to
include a provision mandating referral of disputes to the ICJ); Additional Protocol I, supra note 69
(same); ICCPR, supra note 3 (same); UDHR, supra note 147 (same).

166

See ICJ Statute, supra note 155, art. 36.

167

See Andrew Strauss, Cutting the Cordian Knot [ow and Wy the United Nations Should Vest the
[nternationalCourt of Justice with ReferralJurisdicion,44 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 603, 611 (2011). For the
most recent list of states that have recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the court, see The
International Court of Justice, Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsog,
3 3
http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?pl =5&p2=1&p = (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
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AWS arena (for example, the U.S., China, and Russia).' Furthermore, several
countries that have used drones (and thus may develop an interest in AWSs)
have not filed declarations consenting to the court's authority.'" Thus, the scope
of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction under this option is significantly limited,
at least in the AWS context.'
The final way to create ICJ jurisdiction is for states to enter a special
agreement to submit an existing dispute to the Court,"' but this mechanism is
also unlikely to adequately create jurisdiction in AWS cases. Countries rarely
submit their disputes to the ICJ in the first place.'72 In the context of an AWS
crime, moreover, the offending state has little incentive to submit to the Court's
jurisdiction, as the mere submission of the dispute would create significant
adjudication costs, which would grow much more substantial if it loses. Success,
meanwhile, would provide the offender with virtually no benefits.
On top of the jurisdictional problem, the ICJ also would not be able to
adequately hold offending states responsible because it lacks an enforcement
mechanism."' This has enabled states to refuse to comply with its orders with
impunity.174 While the U.N. Security Council technically may take action to
enforce an ICJ judgment, it has never utilized this power in practice."' As such,
if the ICJ were to hold an offending state liable, there is no guarantee that any
remedy would be realized. In a sense, then, the liability would only be symbolic,
which would probably not provide a sufficient incentive for the victim state to
bring suit in the first place. Likewise, society's and the victim's need for
retribution would likely go unsatisfied, as would the need for criminal law to
deter (even if only at the margins).
168

See THE INTERNATIONAL

COURT

OF JUSTICE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

HANDBOOK

46 (2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/information/en/ibleubook.pdf
jhereinafter ICJ HANDBOOK].
169 Countries that use drones but have not accepted the court's compulsory jurisdiction include
China, France, Iran, Israel, Italy, Russia, Turkey, and the U.S. See Simon Rogers, Drones By Country:
Who HasAllthe UAT/s?, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 3, 2012, available at http://www.theguardian.com/
news/datablog/2012/aug/03/drone-stocks-by-country; ICJ HANDBOOK, supra note 168, at 46.
170
Even if most states had formally accepted the ICJ's jurisdiction as compulsory, this formal
acceptance likely would not do much for generating cases. The Court's compulsory jurisdiction,
whether by declaration or treaty, has not done well in terms of compelling actual state acceptance
of jurisdiction. Indeed, in several of the court's cases, the defendant state simply refused to show
up. S'ee Mark Weston Janis, Somber Reflections on the Compulsory Jurisdictionof the InternationalCourt, 81
AM.J. INT'L L. 144, 144 (1987).
171

See ICJ Statute, supra note 155, art. 36.

172

See Strauss, supra note 167, at 612.
See Janis, supra note 170, at 144-45.

173
174

Vee id

175

See id.
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Ultimately, the ICJ technically would have subject matter jurisdiction over
cases arising out of AWS crimes and could theoretically exert personal
jurisdiction over state parties as long as they consent. This possibility will likely
remain theoretical, however, as most states have not accepted the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction, and offending states have little reason to submit to the
ICJ's authority for AWS disputes. In practice, this jurisdictional barrier, coupled
with the absence of an enforcement mechanism, makes the ICJ a poor medium
for state liability.
B. Accountability in Domestic Courts
While victim states will usually have more resources to bring suit against
offending states, individual victims at least in theory might also be able to legally
challenge the offending state in a domestic court. But for practical reasons, this
option is less than ideal. The people who are likely to suffer from these types of
crimes are usually impoverished and often geographically displaced."' This
mode of accountability would place the burden on them to file an action against
the government of the offending state, which likely will have virtually limitless
resources at its disposal. In the face of such an opponent, individual victims
probably would not take up this burden after already suffering from the initial
crime, even assuming they were sophisticated enough to know of their rights. It
is possible, however, that some victims would have the resources and resolve to
bring a challenge, especially if a non-governmental organization supports them
and the offending state is subject to strict liability for its AWS crimes. As such,
this subsection addresses the legal viability of an individual action in a domestic
court as a mechanism for state accountability.
A victim would first need access to a court in which she could bring suit.
She would have a couple of options. First, she might try to bring an action in a
foreign court, assuming the relevant court's domestic law allowed for such suits.
Unfortunately, few states offer civil remedies for torts committed
extraterritorially.'" Thus, if an American AWS killed a victim in Pakistan in
violation of international law, the victim would have trouble finding a foreign
court in which to sue. Many states instead allow victims to attach a civil claim to

76

See LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 44.

177 See Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga:A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic

Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YAu: J. INT'L L. 1, 2-4, 17-18 (2002)
(observing that the extraterritorial tort doctrine has largely been restricted to the U.S.). In the past,
some U.S. federal courts permitted aliens to file suit for torts committed abroad under the Alien
Tort Statute, but the Supreme Court put an end to that practice in 2013. See generally Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
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a criminal law prosecution of a crime that occurred abroad."' This attachment
alternative would not prove adequate for holding states liable for AWS crimes,
however, as the offending state would not be subject to another state's criminal
laws. Overall, then, foreign courts probably do not offer a viable forum in which
to hold offending states liable.
A second option would be for the victim to sue the offending state in her
own state's courts. For an individual victim to pursue this option, her state's law
would need to afford her a cause of action, like a tort, for example."' In many
states, the mere occurrence of an international crime does not automatically
trigger a domestic cause of action,'s but the harms that will usually result from
AWS crimes (death, bodily injury, and property damage) are of a type typically
covered by tort law. Thus, in most cases victims will likely have a cause of action
to support their claim.' 8 1
The individual victim pursuing this route faces a much more significant
obstacle, however, in the form of sovereign immunity, a doctrine which
normally shields states from liability in other states' courts. At first glance, this
obstacle does not seem insurmountable. While sovereign immunity was
traditionally absolute,'82 many states have created a wide array of exceptions to
83
it,
most notably the territorial tort exception. This exception enables plaintiffs
of the forum state to sue foreign governments for noncommercial torts that
occur within the territory of the forum state.184 It has grown significantly in

See Stephens, supra note 177, at 19 n.62 (noting that many civil law systems such as Austria, Egypt,
France, Italy, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and Venezuela follow this approach).
179 See Bahareh Mostajelean, Note, Foreign Alternatives to the Alien Tort Claims Act: The Success (or Is It
Failure?) of Bringing Civil Suits Against MultinationalCorporationsThat Commit Human Rights Violations,
40 Gio. WASH. INT'L L. Riv. 497, 512 (2008) ("In both common-law and civil-law domestic
systems, civil actions must be based on a claim that is recognized as a violation.").
178

180

See Stephens, supra note 177, at 31.

181 Some

have expressed reservations about reducing an international crime down to a "gardenvariety municipal tort," as doing so could undercompensate the victim or understate the extent of
the harm they suffered. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995). This
suggests that a typical tort action might not be enough to adequately hold the state responsible for
its AWS crimes.
182 See Adam C. Belsky, Mark Merva & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Implied Waiver Under the ESIA: A
Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptoy Norms of InternationalLaw, 77 CAL. L. Ri.v.
365, 377-79 (1989).
183 See M.P.A. Kindall, Immunity of States for Noncommercial Torts: A Comparative Anaysis of the
InternationalLaw Commission's Draft, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1849, 1850-51 (1987).
184

Put formally, this exception allows actions against states that relate to "death or injury to [a]
person, or damage to or loss of tangible property, caused by an act or omission which is alleged to
be attributable to the State, if the act occurred in whole or in part in the territory of that other
State and if the author of the act or omission was present in that territory at the time of the act or
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popularity in recent years' 85 and could potentially allow for actions relating to
AWS crimes, because these international crimes would also likely qualify as
domestic torts.
It is not clear, however, that this exception would consistently bar
sovereign immunity for AWS crimes on the victim state's soil. The exception has
largely been confined to the state's "private" or "management" activities (actajure
gestionis), which are typically commercial in nature.18 By contrast, it has excluded
"sovereign" acts (actajure imperil), which are typically public in nature and include
military actions."' The U.K. and Singapore versions of the territorial tort
exception, for example, explicitly exempt acts of foreign armed forces."
Likewise, a number of national courts have accorded immunity for public and
military actions even when the exception was on the books.' In ratifying either
the U.N. Convention on Immunities or the European Convention on State
Immunity, moreover, several states unequivocally expressed that the territorial
tort exception would not apply to the activities of their armed forces.'90
These factors led the ICJ to conclude in JurisdictionalImmunities of the State

that the territorial tort exception does not bar states from asserting sovereign
immunity in another state's courts for their public acts, including the actions of
their military in the course of an armed conflict.' 9 ' On the contrary, it held that
customary international law requires that "a State be accorded immunity in
proceedings for torts allegedly committed on the territory of another State by its
armed forces and other organs of State in the course of conducting an armed

185

186
187

omission." U.N. Convention on jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, art. 12,
G.A. Res. 59/38, (Dec. 2, 2004) (not yet in force).
Many states have adopted their own version of the exception. Seefor example, State Immunity Act,
c. 33, § 6 (1978) (U.K.); State Immunity Act, R.S.C., c. S-18 (1985) (Can.); State Immunity Act of
1985, c. 313, §7 (1985) (Sing.); Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1981, art. 6 (1981) (S. Aft.).
Moreover, twenty-eight states have ratified the U.N. Convention on Immunities, which also
includes the exception. See U.N. Convention on Immunities, supra note 184, art. 12. The Council
of Europe has also adopted a convention containing it. See European Convention on State
Immunity, art. 11, Europ. T.S. 74 - State Immunity, 16 V.1972 (May 16, 1972).
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening), Judgment, T 64 (Feb. 3,
2012), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/ 143/16883.pdf.
d. 68. See also Sevrine Knuchel, State Immunit and the Promise offus Cogens, 9 Nw. U.J. INT'l Hum.
RTS. 149, 154 (2011).

56

(1978) (U.K.); State Immunity Act of 1985, c. 313,

57

(1985)

188

See State Immunity Act, c. 33,
(Sing.).

189

See Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 186, T 72-75 (describing decisions of courts in Egypt,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, the U.K., Ireland, France, Slovenia, Poland, Brazil, and
Germany).
67-69 (noting that Belgium, Ireland, Slovenia, Greece, Poland, Norway, and Sweden
have declared the territorial tort exception inapplicable to the acts of foreign states' armed forces).

190 See id.
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See id. T 78.
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conflict."'92 It further held that immunity applied even if a state's actions violate

established international law, rejecting the claim that states lose their immunity
when they are "accused of serious violations of international human rights law
or the international law of armed conflict."1 93
This ruling suggests that, even if a state's domestic law permits its citizens
to sue foreign nations for its public actions in armed conflicts, international law
would still bar the action. This likely forecloses victim states' domestic courts as
an avenue by which individuals could hold offending states liable for AWS
crimes that occur during an armed conflict. The ICJ did, however, explicitly
confine its decision to unlawful acts committed "in the course of conducting an armed
conflict."' 94 This arguably implies that conduct by a state's armed forces outside of
an armed conflict would not require a grant of immunity. By extension, domestic
courts may still provide an effectual forum for adjudicating AWS crimes that
occur outside an armed conflict.
The legal viability of victim states' courts as a mechanism for liability, then,
will depend primarily on the context in which AWSs are used. States will
undoubtedly use them in the course of recognized armed conflicts, in which case
immunity will probably attach for any crimes an AWS commits. On the other
hand, if a state uses them outside of a conflict, 95 the territorial tort exception
would likely apply, enabling a suit in the victim state. If AWSs, like drones, are
used, for instance, to target terrorists outside clear geographical zones of
conflict, the applicability of immunity will turn on whether the relevant court
characterizes counterterrorism operations as within the scope of an armed
conflict. The legal characterization of the context in which an AWS is used will
thus determine the efficacy to victims of national courts and private rights of
action.
It thus may technically be possible under international law for individual
victims to sue offending states in the victim state's domestic courts. This legal
possibility, however, will probably not be enough to make victim states' courts
an adequate or feasible mechanism for state liability. It is, after all, a sharply
confined forum, as victims will only be able to sue when the crime occurs

192

Id

193

Id. 191.

194

Id.

195

For example, if a state uses an AWS to assassinate a fugitive or a political leader in a state with

65 (emphasis added).

which the offending state is not in a conflict, such use would fall outside the context of an armed

conflict.
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outside an armed conflict. As AWSs will probably be used most often during
armed conflicts, sovereign immunity will probably apply to most cases.196
Furthermore, even absent this doctrinal limitation, significant practical
obstacles would likely prevent materialization of these suits. In all likelihood,
individual victims will seldom have the resources, sophistication, or resolve to
bring an action in the first place.' For those that might arise, it could prove
difficult to compel the offending state to appear in the victim state's court and
even more difficult to enforce a judgment against them.' Thus, domestic courts
probably would prove to be an ineffective accountability mechanism, even if
individuals would commonly initiate actions against offending states in this
forum. Coupled with the sovereign immunity limitations on such suits, these
practical obstacles make domestic courts a poor instrument for holding states
responsible for AWS violations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, substantial doctrinal and practical obstacles impede the ability
of the current international legal regime to hold states accountable for their
AWS crimes. The ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction does not extend to many states
that may employ AWSs, and most offending states have little incentive to
consent to the Court's authority in AWS cases. Aside from this jurisdictional
barrier, the ICJ also lacks an enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with
its decisions. Domestic courts, meanwhile, face a significant initial hurdle to the
extent that they rely on poorly situated victims to bring suit. Assuming
individuals could overcome this barrier, the offending state could still assert
sovereign immunity to bar the action if the crime occurred during the course of
an armed conflict. For those actions that involve crimes outside of an armed
conflict, domestic courts also often lack the ability to enforce their decisions
against other states.
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See Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 186, 65. It remains unclear, however, whether the
West's campaign against terrorist groups qualifies as an "armed conflict." See discussion supra note
138 and accompanying text. How courts characterize this campaign will likely prove pivotal if the
West seeks to use AWSs against terrorist groups. Should they deem it an "armed conflict," victims
probably will not have much success holding offending states accountable for AWS war crimes in
the victims' domestic courts. Conversely, if courts characterize the campaign as a law enforcement
operation, the likelihood that the territorial tort exception applies increases, opening up domestic
courts as a possible accountability forum.
See LOSING HUMANITY, supranote 6, at 44.

198 See Kindall, supra note 183, at 1862-72 (discussing the problems tort claimants would encounter
in enforcing judgments under the ILC's draft proposal on sovereign immunity, which includes a
territorial tort exception).

Winter 2015

685

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

Given the problems with individual accountability, the impracticality of
state liability suggests that a responsibility gap will indeed emerge once states
begin to employ AWSs.'" It is a near certainty that some AWSs will violate
international law at some point in the future, 200 but "each of the possible
candidates for responsibility," including the state, will likely be "inappropriate or
impractical," thus "granting [states] impunity for all [AWS] use." 201 As such,
there appears to be no mechanism for deterring AWS crimes or for providing
"victims with meaningful retributive justice."202
These implications lend further support to the claim that AWSs should be
preemptively banned, 203 but they do not automatically justify this assertion,
especially given the prospective benefits of AWSs to the states that use them.204
As these weapons will not be developed for several years, the international
community has some time to craft an alternative solution to an outright
prohibition. One alternative, for instance, might be an international agreement
on AWSs. As such a measure could very well emerge in the future ,205 an
opportunity could easily arise to develop a sufficient accountability mechanism.
For instance, such an agreement could require any states that intend to use
AWSs to submit any disputes involving them to the ICJ or some other
international tribunal. This would, at least doctrinally, enable victim states to
hold offending states responsible for AWS crimes.
Alternatively, states could carve out another exception to sovereign
immunity for violations of international law committed by AWSs. Indeed, such
an exception might fall within a broader exception some scholars have
advocated. Specifically, many have argued that immunity should not apply when
a state or its representatives violate a jus cogens norm, that is, a recognized
international norm from which no derogation is allowed."' AWS crimes that

199
200

See Heyns, supra note 12, 80; LOsING HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 44-45; see also Sparrow, supra
note 5, at 74-75.
See LosING HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 42; Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 279.
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Heyns, supra note 12,

202

LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 6, at 45.

203

See id. at 1-2, 45. See generaly Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, supra note 12; International
Committee for Robot Arms Control, supranote 12.
See discussion supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.

204
205

206

80.

See Marchant et al., supra note 19, at 289-90 (noting that there are already several international
conventions that regulate specific forms of weapons technology and that a similar agreement
could be formulated for AWSs); Parnell, supra note 10, at 1 (observing that the U.N. has agreed to
consider a preemptive ban on AWSs during its 2014 term).
See Knuchel, supra note 187, at 175-99 (summarizing the arguments in support of this position);
see, for example, Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the
Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AI. J. INT'il L. 741, 744 (2003); Maria Ermolaeva, Casenote, Crimes
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violate these norms would fall under such an exception, enabling individual
lawsuits in domestic courts. While the ICJ has explicitly declined to endorse the
exception forjus cogens violations,207 that could very well change if states begin to
embrace it in the same way they have embraced the territorial tort exception.2 08
While nations with large defense industries might hesitate to accept these
solutions, they would be more likely to agree to such a solution than to an
outright ban on AWSs, especially if they have concerns that non-state actors or
rogue states might still employ these weapons against them. In any event,
current international accountability mechanisms generally lack the capacity to
effectively hold states responsible for AWS crimes. Some modification to the
present system, therefore, needs to occur if we are to solve the accountability
problem.

207
208

Without Punishment: Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 10 F3d 279 (2d Cir. 1996),
23 S. Ill. U. L.J. 755, 756-57 (1999); Belsky, Merva & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 182, at 366.
Seejurisdictional Immunities, supra note 186, 91.
See id. $ 70 (relying on "State practice" to determine whether the territorial tort exception applies
to acts committed by the armed forces).
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